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Abstract
We provide a survey of the micro and macro economics of climate change from a complexity science
perspective and we discuss the challenges ahead for this line of research. We identify four areas of
the literature where complex system models have already produced valuable insights: (i) coalition
formation and climate negotiations, (ii) macroeconomic impacts of climate-related events, (iii) energy
markets and (iv) diffusion of climate-friendly technologies. On each of these issues, accounting
for heterogeneity, interactions and disequilibrium dynamics provides a complementary and novel
perspective to the one of standard equilibrium models. Furthermore, it highlights the potential
economic benefits of mitigation and adaptation policies and the risk of under-estimating systemic
climate change-related risks.
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1 Introduction
This paper provides a survey of the economics of climate change from a complexity science perspective
and underlines the challenges ahead for this line of research.
Mitigation and adaptation to climate change represent governance challenges of an unprecedented
scale because of their long-term horizon, their global nature and the massive uncertainties they involve.
Against this background, equilibrium models generally used in Integrated Assessment Models (IAM)
represent the economy as a system with a unique equilibrium, climate policy as an additional constraint
in the optimization problem of the social planner and consider the uncertainty of climate-related dam-
ages to be predictable enough to be factored out in the expected utility of a representative agent. There
is growing concern in the literature that this picture might convey a false impression of control (see
Pindyck, 2013; Stern, 2013, 2016; Weitzman, 2013; Revesz et al., 2014; Farmer et al., 2015, among many
contributions) and that IAMs might underestimate both the cost of climate change and the benefits
resulting from the transition to a low carbon-emission economy (Stern, 2016).
Network and agent-based models have been increasingly advocated as alternatives fit to handle
out-of-equilibrium dynamics, tipping points and large transitions in socio-economic systems (see e.g
Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006; Balbi and Giupponi, 2010; Kelly et al., 2013; Smajgl et al., 2011; Farmer
et al., 2015; Stern, 2016; Mercure et al., 2016). These classes of models consider the real world as a
complex evolving system, wherein the interaction of many heterogeneous agents possibly reacting across
different spatial and temporal scales give rise to the emergence of aggregate properties that cannot be
deduced by the simple aggregation of individual ones (Flake, 1988; Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006). The
development of agent-based integrated assessment model can overcome the shortfall of equilibrium
models and ease stakeholder participation and scenario exploration (Moss et al., 2001; Moss, 2002a).
Indeed, the higher degree of realism of ABMs (Farmer and Foley, 2009; Farmer et al., 2015) allows to
involve policy makers in the process of the development of the model employed for policy evaluation
(Moss, 2002b).
In this paper we present a critical review of the existing literature about complex system approaches
to the economics of climate change, focusing in particular on agent-based models. Even if this research
line is still in its infancy, it has already produced valuable insights into the functioning of economies
facing climate and environment issues. We identify the main results, policy implications, limitations,
and open issues that future research efforts should address. Moreover, we consider how the discussed
contributions might serve as building blocks for a new generation of models.
We distinguish four main fields relevant to the economics of climate change in which complex
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system models have been fruitfully applied.1 The first consists in the analysis of climate negotiations
and coalition formation (cf. Section 2). There, we show that out-of-equilibrium dynamics, learning
and influence among and within heterogeneous actors are pivotal to get a full understanding of the
barriers and the potential paths to cooperation that are key concerns for international climate-policy
negotiations like the recent Paris agreement.
Second, we concentrate on agent-based models studying the macroeconomics of climate change (see
Section 3). These models study in particular how the interactions between heterogeneous agents affect
the aggregate performance of an economy facing increasing climate risks. They have shed new light
on the different role that micro-level climate and weather shocks have on macroeconomic dynamics, on
the risk stemming from climate policy and the profound interconnectivity affecting the overall system.
The next milestone in this field is the development of the first generation of agent-based integrated
assessment models.
Third, we consider the functioning of the energy sector, which is by far the largest emitter of green-
house gases globally (see Section 4). In this field, deregulation (especially in electricity market) has
pushed modelers to shift their attention from monopoly and oligopoly settings to complex structures
characterized by heterogenous players interacting in energy markets with different institutional settings.
ABMs have been employed to study pricing rules, market power in complex institutional settings, the
evolution of financial networks and networks of influence in the energy industry. Finally, agent-based
models have also been employed to analyze the comparative effects of climate policies on electricity
prices, the energy technology mix and energy efficiency.
Fourth, agent-based models have been largely employed to study the process of technical change
and innovation diffusion, which lie at the core of the structural change needed for the transition to a
low-carbon economy (cf. Section 5). Herein, an adequate characterization of the Knightian uncertainty
(Knight, 1921) affecting search for innovations, a correct accounting of path dependencies in technolog-
ical development and a strong emphasis on the role that interaction structures and institutions play on
the selection landscape are essential to correctly analyze conditions that might favor (or impede) shifts
from one technological paradigm to an alternative one (see Dosi and Nelson, 2010, for a comprehensive
discussion on innovation and technical change from an evolutionary perspective).
Finally, we provide a general critical assessment of the adoption of agent-based and network models
to study the micro and macro economics of climate change (see Section 6). In particular, we will stress
the current weaknesses and the potential research directions to further improve such models in order
1We do not consider land-use agent-based models. This increasing stream of literature, where ABMs are largely applied,
has its own specific features and would deserve a more extensive and autonomous treatment. See Matthews et al. (2007)
for a survey on the topic and Filatova et al. (2013) for a recent discussion.
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Figure 1: Global emissions by country and sector.
(a) Global emissions by country. (b) Global emissions by sector.
Note: Panel 1a shows 2011 global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and some industrial processes by country.
Source: Boden et al. (2015). Panel 1b shows global greenhouse gas emissions by economic sector. Source: IPCC (2014).
to address the complex interconnections between economic dynamics and climate change.
2 Coalitions formation and climate negotiations
Effectiveness and stability of international climate agreements are pivotal to the fulfilment of the long
run objectives of decoupling output and emissions growth and, ultimately, containing rise in global
mean surface temperature. Figure 1a shows that global emissions are quite fragmented overall but, on
the other side, few large players account for more than half of the total value. This fact highlights the
importance of international cooperation, where agreements between major players is required to get
substantial effects in the short run. In line with the seminal contribution of Barrett (1994), the main
outcome of the game-theoretic literature on the formation of international environmental agreements
has been that it is extremely difficult to sustain global cooperation among a large number of strategic
actors solely on the grounds of environmental benefits. This negative result is somehow at odds with the
mild successes obtained on climate change mitigation through the Kyoto protocol and, more recently,
the Paris agreement. A commonly accepted explanation for the presence of this gap in the theory
is that a static one-shot game model with a large number of homogeneous players can possibly serve
as a benchmark but does not account for the full complexity and the specific context of international
agreements such as those pursued in climate negotiations. Therefore, the literature has developed
in two complementary directions that tried to account respectively for (i) the multi-dimensional and
heterogeneous aspects of actors’ strategies and (ii) the dynamic, “local” and/or hierarchical nature of
the interactions between agents.
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Within the equilibrium-centered game-theoretic literature, these developments have led to positive
results about the stability of grand coalitions when effects due to networks (see e.g Benchekroun and
Claude, 2007), heterogeneity (e.g McGinty, 2006) or more simply transfers (see e.g Hoel and Schneider,
1997) are accounted for. A wide literature that linked pay-offs in the “emissions game” to the outcome
of integrated assessment models (IAMs) also developed. In particular, Lessmann et al. (2015) com-
pare stability results for climate agreements from five different IAMs and find that, across all models,
heterogeneity of regions improves incentives to participate.
The equilibrium-centered literature focused only on the stability issue relying on very strong as-
sumptions about the rationality and the stationarity of preferences of state actors. As a consequence,
it remained silent about the barriers and the potential paths to cooperation that are key concerns for
policy applications. In order to get a full understanding on them, one needs models accounting for
out-of-equilibrium dynamics, learning and influence among and within state actors.
2.1 Learning and cooperation
A first step in that direction has consisted in investigating behavioral and institutional aspects of
learning and cooperation in game-theoretic settings. Breton et al. (2010) considers a set of countries
that can be either signatory or non-signatory of an emission reduction agreement. Non-signatory
countries maximize their individual welfare, while signatory countries maximize their joint welfare
and punish non-signatories (e.g through trade sanctions). The proportion of signatory countries is then
assumed to follow a replicator dynamics. Numerical solutions show the emergence of multiple equilibria
corresponding to no-cooperation and either partial or full cooperation. Phase transition mechanisms
underline the existence of thresholds in terms of the stock of emission and/or number of signatories above
which the system eventually reaches full cooperation. Smead et al. (2014) represent negotiations as an
N-player bargaining game where countries/players bargain about their percentage emission reduction.
The agents are adaptive and update their pledges on the basis of expectations formed using a variant
of fictitious play. Cooperation and disagreement are both equilibria of the underlying game as well
as attractors of the ensuing dynamics. The authors argue that a potential obstacle to successful
negotiations not related to the stability of feasible solutions is “whether learners can find these solutions
and avoid disagreement equilibria”. They also point out that the larger the number of players, the less
likely cooperation emerges. Interestingly, however, they show that prior/sequential agreements between
subsets of countries increase the chance of reaching a global solution.
Both contributions put emphasis on the progressive formation of climate clubs as pathways for
efficient mitigation policy (see e.g. Nordhaus et al., 2015; Heitzig et al., 2011). Yet, the focus on states
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as the only relevant actors as well as the uni-dimensionality of the perspective limit the new insights
that can emerge from such models. They are also silent about the formation and the evolution of
preferences and contrast with the emphasis put by Putnam (1988) on the linkages between national
and international politics. Moreover, in the context of climate policy, they are at odds with Jaeger and
Jaeger (2011), who argues that the consensus on the objective of limiting global warming to 2 degrees
resulted from a combination of physical, environmental, economic, diplomatic or ethical arguments,
which let the 2 degrees target emerge as a focal point on the basis of which actors can anticipate and
make decisions. As emphasized by Janssen and Ostrom (2006) and Lempert et al. (2009), agent-based
models are particularly well-fitted for such multilevel, multi-agents decision-making problems.
2.2 The role of interactions
From a macro-level perspective, Courtois and Tazda¨ıt (2007) subsume the standard game-theoretic
approach to international environmental agreements by considering that agents and countries employ
the outcome of a game-theoretic analysis as an expert’s recommendation, but actually determine their
policy in a sequence of bargaining interactions with their peers. During such interactions, agents can
either imitate, persuade or dissuade each others to cooperate to climate change mitigation. Depending
on the propensity of countries to imitate and on their bargaining power, different stable configurations
emerge in the model corresponding to different levels of international collaboration. Such results extend
the one of the standard game-theoretic literature, by shedding light on the behavioral determinants of
failure and success in negotiations.
A second series of contributions has focused on the bottom-up formation of climate policies through
the interactions of micro-level agents. In the battle of perspectives of Janssen and de Vries (1998), three
types of agents (Individualists, Hierarchists and Egalitarian) coexist. They differ in their “world-view”,
which captures their beliefs about climate sensitivity, the cost of mitigation and its climate-related
impacts. They also have different preferences about macro-economic and climate policy objectives.
The economy is actually governed according to a weighted average of the preferences of the population.
As the system evolves through time, world-views might turn out to be more or less accurate, and their
share in the population evolves according to their fitness. The authors emphasize that these adaptive
dynamics can yield trajectories that differ massively from those induced by “utopia” (in which there
is a unique well-defined social preference and correct expectations) and therefore one needs to account
for bias and errors in the definition of long-term emission scenarios.
Isley et al. (2015) consider firms that lobby a government for more or less stringent climate policies
(e.g carbon price or carbon tax). Beneath the strategically determined climate policy, the economic
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pathway is defined following the agent-based dynamics introduced in Dosi et al. (2010). In this frame-
work, the authors investigate the efficiency of different institutional architectures for climate policy.
They emphasize that a necessary condition for an effective policy is the emergence of a stable con-
stituency in favor of a stringent climate policy which, in turn, requires a steady stream of technological
innovation to maintain firm heterogeneity. This series of linkages highlights the importance of account-
ing for the interdependencies between, inter alia, the economic, industrial and political spheres and
how this is made possible by agent-based modeling.
Relatedly, Earnest (2008) and Greeven (2015) aim to provide a comprehensive perspective on the
political issues linked to international negotiations by implementing an agent-based version of Putnam
(1988) two-level games, with negotiators and their constituencies as agents. Earnest (2008) considers
negotiators who ought to coordinate on an international (environmental) agreement that is acceptable
by their constituencies. Both negotiators and their constituencies have evolving preferences. Negotia-
tors are sensitive to the preferences of other negotiators and of their own constituencies. Constituencies
also influence each other transnationally. Such a model seems to better account for the complexity
of climate negotiations and allows to study path histories that are important to multiple equilibria
games. The main findings of the model are that factors favoring coordination are (i) a large number of
negotiating parties, (ii) dense transnational influence, (iii) fast-evolving preferences, (iv) sensitivity to
constituencies preferences, and (v) relative independence from other negotiators’ preferences. Similarly,
Greeven (2015) uses the two-level game framework of Putnam, but further adds to the model uncer-
tainties about the probability of climate-related impacts and the awareness of the public about such
risks. The model is then used to identify consistent and plausible narratives on the pathways leading
to the emergence of climate change mitigation. In that, it highlights the potential usage of agent-based
modeling for scenario discovery (see also Rozenberg et al., 2014; Gerst et al., 2013).
2.3 Open issues
Being grounded on heterogenous, interacting actors, agent-based models offers a methodology both to
gain insights about the workings of the international negotiation process and to build scenarios about
potential long-term trajectories. Downing et al. (2001) also emphasize the potential of agent-based
model for stakeholder engagement in the design of climate policies and puts forward as a prototype of
such an approach an agent-based model of water management in the Thames region of England (see
also Tesfatsion et al., 2015). However, to be extended at a broader scale, this approach requires to
integrate climate negotiation models with ABMs representing the evolution of the economy over the
long term. In that, the macro agent-based models presented in the next Section could constitute a
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useful starting point to link climate negotiations and macroeconomic dynamics.
3 Climate-change macroeconomics
Studying the co-evolution between climate change and macroeconomic dynamics poses non trivial
challenges. First the lack of long macroeconomic time series makes difficult to empirically explore
the inter-dependences between the two systems.2 Second, climate and macroeconomic dynamics occur
at different time scales. Third, the poor understanding of human responses to warmer climates and
extreme weather events renders difficult the characterization of climate damages.
Given the foregoing issues, one of the main advantage of macro ABM is to allow for a micro-level
representation of the interactions between climate change and economic dynamics (as emphasized in
particular by Moss, 2002a and, more recently, Farmer et al., 2015). Indeed, the agent-based approach
can better account for the out-of-equilibrium dynamics shifting the economy from a business-as-usual to
a green growth path. Moreover, network and agent-based models can provide a more accurate represen-
tation of climate-related damages considering distributional issues and the role of system connectivity.
Relatedly, complexity-based models can be employed to study how climate change risks impact on
financial market dynamics. Finally, the fast pace at which ABMs have blossoming in the last years has
lead to the development of a new generation of agent-based integrated-assessment models (Lamperti
et al., 2016).
3.1 Macro-climate ABMs
With respect to the analysis of the energy transition, a pioneering contribution is this of Robalino
and Lempert (2000) (see also Brouwers et al., 2001), which use a simple ABM to test the effectiveness
of “carrots” (incentives to technology adoption) vis-a`-vis that of “sticks” (carbon taxes and emissions
trading, which increase the price of high-emitting technologies for all users) in pushing the economy
towards a low-carbon development path. They show that coupling carbon taxes and technology in-
centives is the best approach to cut greenhouse gas emissions. Their result is mainly driven by the
heterogeneity of consumers’ preferences and expectations.3 Notwithstanding these interesting insights,
the model is too simple to account for multiple equilibria and endogenous growth. This limitation
might be particularly relevant in the design of climate policy. As suggested by Jaeger et al. (2013),
policy makers should reframe the problem of climate change from a zero-sum game to win-win solutions,
2For example, in Dell et al. (2012), the authors are constrained to employ a relatively short sample of 50 years and
find that temperature shocks seem not to affect developed countries.
3The superiority of combining taxes and subsidies with respect to solutions based on a single policy prescription has
also been obtained in a general equilibrium model by Acemoglu et al. (2012).
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i.e. designing mitigation measures that are beneficial for the economy. In a framework where several
equilibria are possible, the mitigation problem is not linked to scarcity but rather to a coordination
issue (Jaeger, 2012).
One of the first attempts to dynamically model a complex economy together with a climate module
can be traced back to the LAGOM model family (Haas and Jaeger, 2005). Heterogeneous households
and producers face the risk of climate-related damages and are offered insurance contracts. An “ex-
pectation manager” helps insurers and households to up-date their expectations on the basis of new
observations. Finally, the model is characterized by the presence of a market module where interactions
involving households and insurers determine weather insurance prices through. LAGOM operates at
multiple time scales: market interchanges occurs much faster than climate change, and industrial pro-
duction takes place at intermediate frequencies. The flexible accounting for different time scales is an
advantage of ABMs vis-a´-vis traditional IAMs, which usually consider yearly equilibrium adjustments
both in the economic and climate system.4 Mandel et al. (2009) and, more recently, Wolf et al. (2013)
have further extended the LAGOM model to simulate a growing economy with the possibility of speci-
fying different interacting economic areas and to study the properties of economic growth as emerging
from spatially explicit production networks. In each region, energy is produced within specific sectors
with carbon emissions as a by-product. The model could then be used to test different mitigation
policies.
Economic dynamics mainly affects climate change via the degree of environmental friendliness of
production technologies, i.e. the amount of GHG emissions stemming from production. In general,
production might involve goods, capital and energy. There are few sufficiently sophisticated agent-
based models to deal with all these three aspects. Beckenbach and Briegel (2010), for example, limit
themselves to the study of a generic production process, which is decomposed across different but not
well-specified sectors. In a Schumpeterian setting, growth is triggered by firms’ innovation and imitation
strategies, and emission dynamics depends on two exogenous parameters governing the diffusion of low-
carbon innovations and their quality. Gerst et al. (2013) propose an agent-based model that completely
endogenizes the process of technical change leading to the diffusion of less emission-intense machines.
Drawing on the Keynes+Schumpeter model (K+S, cf. Dosi et al., 2010), they study a complex economy
composed of two vertically related industrial sectors and an energy production module, where competing
technologies can be used to generate energy that is subsequently distributed through the system. The
model is calibrated on US macroeconomic data and simulated until the end of the century to study
different carbon tax recycling schemes. They find that only a policy focused on subsidies to carbon-free
technology oriented R&D allows a swift transition away from “dirty” energy technologies, and, in turns,
4Or, in a variety of cases, adjustment periods of 5 years (see e.g. Nordhaus, 1992; Bosetti et al., 2006).
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to higher economic growth. Similar results are found in the ABM developed by Rengs et al. (2015).
The major issues addressed in the contributions described so far is the identification of possible
growth trajectories for both the economy and aggregate emissions, and in the adoption of fiscal pol-
icy (mainly carbon-taxes and subsidies) to direct the system towards some of these directions. The
value added consists in the analysis of growth as a stable phenomenon emerging from an ecology of
heterogeneous agents, whose different reactions to policies and uncertain environments can move the
economy along trajectories that cannot be deduced otherwise. However, a key element is missing the
picture. Indeed, the relationship between macroeconomic properties and the climate is explored in a
single direction. The feedbacks that agents (firms, energy-production plants, households, etc.) receive
from a increasing and possibly more volatile temperatures have been generally ignored. Building on
the baseline setting provided by Dosi et al. (2010), Isley et al. (2013) construct a prototype for a hybrid
agent-based integrated assessment model that could support the design of a government’s regulatory
climate policies. The authors underline the usefulness of the approach in analyzing transformative
solutions, that is, in examining how measures intended to reduce GHG emissions can trigger market-
induced transformations, which, in turn, affect the government’s ability to maintain its policy in an
environment where agents affect the climate and receive back climate-related damages. However, in the
latter framework, the climate system is left out of the picture and damages are linked to emissions, not
to the average surface temperature. Moreover, environmental damages are modeled like in standard
IAM (see e.g. Nordhaus, 1992, 2008; Tol, 1997) as aggregate cuts to potential GDP levels.
3.2 Climate shocks, damages and system connectivity
In most Integrated Assessment Models, climate damages are accounted for by an ad hoc damage function
that impacts output (at the sectoral or the macro level) as a function of temperature increases brought
about by GHG emissions (see the discussion in Pindyck, 2013). This approach ignores the propagation
of shocks and the feedbacks that might relate damages to different sectors. Moreover, as most IAMs do
not allow for agent heterogeneity, they entirely overlook distributional issues linked to climate damages.
Against this background, one of the characterizing features of complex systems lies in their repre-
sentation of real phenomena as emerging from the interactions of heterogeneous agents. This approach
alllows to model the emergence of aggregate damages from micro shocks in production, procurement
or finance percolating along network structures where households, firms, banks and the government
interact. For example, Hallegatte (2008) provides a model of shock propagation within Louisiana after
the impact of hurricane Katrina. In the model, firms adapt their behavior in an input-output network.5
5Input-output are powerful tools to assess how a shock on one or several sectors propagates into the economy through
intermediate consumption and demand Haimes and Jiang (2001); Okuyama (2004); Cochrane (2004).
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The model has also been employed to to assess the risks of coastal floods in a climate change frame-
work and extended to examine the role of inventories in production dynamics and supply shortages
(Hallegatte et al., 2010; Hallegatte, 2014). Simulation results show that propagation mechanisms are
essential for the assessment of the consequences of disasters, and that taking into account residual
production capacities is necessary not to overestimate the positive economic effects of reconstruction.
A straightforward consequence is the central role played by the topology of the production network,
which determines how firms are linked each other and how (intermediate) goods flow though these
links. Similarly, Henriet et al. (2012) disaggregate industry input-output tables to represent the pro-
duction structure of regional economies at firm level. They show that aggregate damages stemming
from exogenous disasters are deeply affected by the network structure and the final outcomes depend
especially on network concentration and clustering.6
Systems’ connectivity increases dramatically the complexity of studying the impact of climate
events, and the impossibility to reduce the problem through simple aggregation or to impede fail-
ures at all scales calls for a re-design of how modeling climate and weather damages (see also, Helbing,
2013). Moving from a relatively restricted geographical focus to a global perspective, Bierkandt et al.
(2014) introduce Acclimate, a model designed to evaluate the consequences of extreme climate events
through the global supply chain. The model nests agent-based features (consumption and production
sites are treated as agents) in an input-output network employed to track flows of goods in the system
(taking also into account transportation). Acclimate is particularly well suited to study the propaga-
tion of shocks and it has been extended to better explore the differences between top-down cascades
promoted by forwards linkages and demand-induced backward dynamics Wenz et al. (2014). However,
as it runs at very short-time scales (from days to some week), price adjustment mechanisms are nearly
absent at the current stage and technical change is overlooked.
3.3 Integrated assessment agent-based models
Despite the methodological advantages that agent-based models offer to the representation of produc-
tion networks, the study of system’s resilience and its reaction to different kind of shocks, there have
been little efforts in employing these tools to investigate the effects of climate change on the aggregate
economy.7 To the best of our knowledge, Lamperti et al. (2016) introduces the first attempt to bridge a
6In particular, concentration (degree of redundancy of suppliers and clients) acts as a risk sharing feature and clustering
(degree of geographically dense interactions) allows small groups of interconnected firms to positively react to shocks
happening outside the community they belong to.
7On the contrary, Okuyama and Santos (2014) discuss and devote a special issue of Economic Systems Research
to combine the treatment of climate-related disasters within standard input-output or computable general equilibrium
models.
11
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.58
 
 
fully-fledged agent-based integrated assessment model with a representation of climate-economic feed-
backs, which take the form of stochastic shocks hitting agents with probability and size depending on
the dynamics of the global mean surface temperature. The model, called DSK, builds on Dosi et al.
(2010, 2013) and is composed by two industries populated by heterogenous firms, a financial sector,
an energy module and, a climate box grounded on Sterman et al. (2013). The model replicates a wide
range of macro and micro stylized facts as well empirical regularities concerning climate change and
economic dynamics (e.g. cointegration among energy consumption, GDP and GHG emissions). Given
its satisfying explanatory power, the model can be employed as a laboratory to study the short (transi-
tions) and long-run (development trajectory) effects of a wide ensemble of climate, energy, innovation,
fiscal and monetary policies. The model can also be extended to account for heterogenous banks, finan-
cial markets and population growth. The latter element, often overlooked in climate-macroeconomic
modeling, can play a determinant role in shaping future scenarios and it has been previously included
within an agent-based model in Castesana et al. (2013).
3.4 Finance and climate risks
The financing of the transition towards a low-carbon economy has still not been accurately explored in
the economic literature. Indeed, as discussed above, the vast majority of modeling efforts focuses on
government’s fiscal policy. Recently, the role that financial and banking systems might play in inducing
“green” investments and “green” entrepreneurship has received increasing attention(Mazzucato, 2015;
Campiglio, 2016). Different types of green fiscal (carbon tax, tax relief and breaks on investment in
renewable energy) and targeted monetary policies (green bonds and quantitative easing) are simulated
in the Eirin model (Monasterolo and Raberto, 2016), which combines system dynamics and agent-based
features. The authors find that green policy measures allow to improve economic performance without
creating pressures on the financial system vis-a`-vis a business-as-usual scenario. In such a context,
the relation between fast de-carbonization policies and financial stability is emerging as a prominent
concern on the climate policy agenda. On one side the financial system can foster the transition to a
green development path. On the other side, it is increasingly exposed to climate risks.
Within this setting, the structure of the relationships among financial institutions might be crucial
for the stability of the whole system. Focusing on this issue from a network perspective, Battiston
et al. (2016) analyze the exposure of different classes of actors in the system using a well known macro-
network stress testing model (Battiston et al., 2012; Bardoscia et al., 2015). They find that the direct
exposure to fossil fuel and energy-intensive sectors, while limited overall, is relevant for investment
funds, which in turns are highly connected with the banking system. Further, the housing sector can
12
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potentially trigger shocks which can be amplified by the financial system. Given the empirically well-
documented degree of interdependences between actors in the financial, production and energy sides
of the economy (Buldyrev et al., 2010; Beale et al., 2011; Battiston et al., 2012; Homer-Dixon et al.,
2015), the role of such relationships with respect to climate policy and their response to a changing
climate, is likely to be a challenge for future macro-oriented agent-based and network models.
3.5 Open issues
Our understanding of the aggregate effects produced by climate change on the economic system is still
limited. Complexity theory pushes forward the idea that single components are linked, interacting and
heterogeneous. As a by-product, aggregate effects emerge from the evolution of micro behaviours.
From a macroeconomic perspective, there are three main issues that the future developments of
agent-based and network models should account for. The first concerns inequality and the distributional
effects of climate change. While standard models (e.g. DSGE rooted on the representative agent
paradigm) require ad-hoc assumptions to deal with heterogeneity and typically confine it to a single
side of the economy (Bosetti and Maffezzoli, 2013; Dennig et al., 2015), agent-based models provide a
“natural” framework to answer questions like what are the income classes that will be more adversely
affected by climate change? Does inequality affect system resilience to climate change?. However, to
provide adequate answer, models rooted in complexity theory need to better account for social welfare
and policy evaluation.
The second issue concerns the relationships between financial and interbank markets and the tran-
sition to a low carbon economy. While transitions are usually modeled from the real side, i.e. as
self-financing structural process driven by technical change (see also section 5), better understanding
the role of finance and its interrelations with innovation is the challenge ahead.
The third issue we is intimately linked to both the second and the first. While most general
equilibrium models find a smooth, optimal growth path for our economy, agent-based ones endogenously
generate crises, fluctuations and growth instability. Relevant questions for future research concern the
investigation of what kind of climate and weather events mostly affect system’s stability and how
financial markets might deal with associated climate and climate-policy risks.
4 Energy markets
As the the energy sector is the main producer of CO2 emissions (cf. Figure 1), it has a pivotal role in
the transition to a low-carbon economy.
Prior to deregulation, the dispatch program was solved through optimization methods by regulated
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or State-owned vertically integrated utilities, whose goal was to minimize the system-wide cost of elec-
tricity generation and transmission. The adequacy of optimization models in depicting how electricity
markets work has declined after the deregulation of energy markets, a process that has unfolded in
many countries in the last 20 years (see e.g. Borenstein et al., 2000 or Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). With
the intended consequence of lower electricity prices for end users, competition has been introduced in a
market characterized by technological entry barriers. Oligopoly models assuming optimizing producers
have been crafted to analyse the new scenario (see Ventosa et al., 2005), yet they often neglect the
complexity of setting bids and offers for power on a physical network subject to load balancing con-
straints and spatial externalities. Cognitive biases of market participants cannot be neglected, either
(see Rothkopf, 1999; Denton et al., 2001; Rassenti et al., 2003).
Electricity markets are thus perfect candidates for the application of computational methods, see
e.g. Tesfatsion (2003), Sun and Tesfatsion (2007), or overviews in Weidlich and Veit (2008) and Guerci
et al. (2010). ABMs have entered the policy-making process as decision-support tools (e.g., Nicolaisen
et al., 2001, Guerci et al., 2005 and Li and Tesfatsion, 2009). Through ABMs, scholars have explored
issues such as pricing rules and market power exercise (Bower and Bunn, 2001, Bunn and Oliveira,
2003, Bunn and Martoccia, 2005, Guerci et al., 2008, Kowalska-Pyzalska et al., 2014) and, closer to
our interests, the comparative effects of climate policies on the diffusion of renewables and on energy
efficiency, that in turn affect electricity prices. Few works have compared the explanatory power of
optimizing models and ABMs with respect to electricity market dynamics, concluding in favor of ABMs
(see Saguan et al., 2006 and Guerci and Sapio, 2011).8
4.1 Support to renewables and its effects
The influence of climate policy on electricity markets can work through several channels. Climate policy
can stimulate the diffusion of energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies, which in turn impact
upon the properties of electricity price series by changing the shape and dynamics of electricity demand
and supply. The pattern of effects closely depends on the policy mix that has been implemented.
The integration in the existing transmission and distribution networks of a large number of micro-
generators, characterized by unpredictable generation profiles, represents an important challenge for
transmission system operators (Bruckner et al., 2005, Anaya and Pollitt, 2015 in the special issue edited
by Boffa and Sapio, 2015), given that the existing grids were conceived under the so-called centralized
generation paradigm (Kunneke, 2008). In a recent attempt to study a 100% renewable scenario in
the Australian market, Elliston et al. (2012) try to match the actual hourly electricity demand of five
8Applications of the ABM methodology to other energy markets are less frequent, e.g. Voudouris et al. (2011) on crude
oil markets.
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selected states and one territory of Australia. The 100% renewable supply scenario is shown to be
technically feasible, but the challenge is to cover winter evenings in the days when the sun-powered
supply is low, i.e. overcast days, and wind speed is too low. Biomass fueled gas turbines coupled with
the efforts to increase the winter peak demand are necessary to solve this issue. The need to rely on gas
fueled micro-generation is consistent with the results in Faber et al. (2010), whose ABM indicates that
gas prices, as primary fuel of this technology, are a critical component in the success of the decentralized
paradigm.
Is the cost of large renewable penetration rates worth it? In the short run, lower electricity prices
ensue because fossil fuel sources, characterized by relatively high marginal costs, are displaced (the so-
called merit order effect). de Miera et al. (2008) simulated the power market solution based on Spanish
data, to find that the merit order effect was stronger than the cost of renewable energy support arising
from feed-in-tariffs. In Banal-Estanol and Ruperez Micola (2011), the merit order effect is not enough
to lead to competitive pricing. This is the outcome of a simulation model in which two symmetric
high-cost plants compete with a low-cost wind power plant. Intermittency in wind power generation
gives rise to uncertainty on the market-clearing solution, which is hedged by generating companies by
means of positive price-cost margins. In the above cited works, power plant capacities were given.
Browne et al. (2015) explore the merit order effect in a model wherein capacity investments are instead
endogenized. In such a long-term scenario, simulations show that the merit order effect is counteracted
by market power exercise, which is also causing an inefficient electricity dispatch.
One reason behind the persistence of market power in the long-run concerns the network configura-
tions arising in an increasingly decarbonized electricity industry. Along these lines, Guerci and Sapio
(2012) investigate the impact of increasing wind power capacity on the Italian wholesale electricity
prices and on power grid configurations. The simulation outputs show that electricity prices decrease
in response to increasing wind power generation, but remain above marginal costs due to the increasing
frequency of grid congestion, calling for investments in transmission infrastructures. The simulations
in L’Abbate et al. (2014) aimed to assess the prospective effects of interconnections between Northern
Africa and Italy, which could exploit the immensely rich potential of the Sahara desert for solar thermal
power production, as envisaged by the Mediterranean Solar Plan (see also Sapio, 2014 and the book by
Cambini and Rubino, 2014 on this issue). The authors found that Italy would become a net importer
of renewables from Africa, leading to electricity price reduction. The endogenous adaptation of grid
infrastructures, though, is missing from both models.
Taking steps forward from the above literature, Mureddu et al. (2015) develop an hybrid agent based
and network model, which uses grid topology as an input and simulates the behaviour of heterogeneous
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plants. The model allows to forecast the energy price and to disentangle the contribution of each primary
energy source to the downward and upward electricity balancing markets. As a significant result, the
authors show that market shares in the balancing market do not depend only on energy costs but
stem from the a blend of dynamic response, energy costs, geographical position (which constitute the
network element of the model) and interactions among the different energy sources.
4.2 Energy efficiency
A simulation study of the impact of climate policies on households energy use is performed via a
domestic stock agent-based model by Lee et al. (2014), focusing on the UK. They investigate multiple
scenarios (e.g. taxes, subsidies, and decarbonisation) for the evaluation of domestic energy efficiency
policies. Simulation results show that the current goals (80% reduction of energy consumption by 2050)
will not be completely achieved. In the most favourable scenario, a 60% reduction may be achieved
from 2008 to 2050. The study briefly analyses another policy, namely the introduction of a carbon tax,
that has a significant impact in the energy demand reduction in a long-term horizon, but with many
political obstacles such as the risk of fuel poverty (i.e. households spend more than 10% of their income
for heating and hot water) and the increase of electricity prices. The ABM in Jackson (2010) rather
highlights the benefits of coordinating energy efficiency and smart grid policies, by showing through
simulations that peak hour electricity demand can be reduced by one third when energy efficiency and
smart grids policies are considered together.
4.3 Carbon trading and green certificates
Most literature on climate policy frames the discussion on how to achieve the emission reduction targets
through market-based tools, such as carbon trading. For recent overview of the current carbon trading
schemes, the reader is referred to Perdan and Azapagic (2011) and Sorrell and Sijm (2003).9
In Wang et al. (2012), energy generating companies are modeled as adaptive agents that are bidding
in an electricity market with cap-and-trade emission systems in place. Q-learning is used to model the
process of strategy updating by agents trading on different time horizons (year, week, dynamic). The
results show that generating companies can receive higher profits through higher frequency of trading,
raising questions on the adequate market micro-structure for emission trading with respect to the
ultimate policy objective. Such an intuition is further strengthened by Zhang et al. (2011), where
an ABM is used to model the Chinese market for emissions, highlighting that transaction costs can
decrease total emission trading amount and market efficiency remarkably.
9An investigation of personal carbon trading as a future evolution of emission trading policies is discussed by Fawcett
(2010).
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Recently, the ABM developed by Zhang et al. (2016) shows that an emissions trading system
influences obsolete power generating technologies with lower abatement levels, but does not promote
the adoption of the most advanced technology. Furthermore, national emissions trading encourages
power plants to adopt technologies with relatively higher removal rates compared with separate regional
emissions trading systems, but a national program also decreases the adoption of the most advanced
technologies. Bunn and Munoz (2016), instead, have focused on the comparative role of targeting
capacity versus energy markets. Their simulations show that the replacement of coal with wind imposes
extra costs related to reserve capacity, and have compared alternative policies to face this challenge,
namely capacity payments funded by customers and a reliability requirement on wind generators with
capital cost or energy feed-in subsidies. They find that support through capital grants is more cost-
effective than through green certificates.
4.4 Open issues
Few attempts have been made to analyze the interlinkages between different markets or, more generally,
to embed the energy sector in the broader economic and financial landscape. Recent insights on the
network structure behind the European emission trading system (EU-ETS, see Karpf et al., 2016)
suggest that the shape of the network structure itself is an important issue, possibly shedding light on the
increasing financialisation of the energy sector and its long-term effects under different climate scenarios.
Relatedly, as far as the authors know, the interconnectedness of producers with their parent companies
and the underlying systemic risks within energy markets has not received an in-depth exploration, as it
has been done for financial markets (for example see the DebtRank measure in Battiston et al., 2012).
The financial interdependence of electricity markets players represents a promising field for further
study. Similarly for the dynamics of mergers and acquisitions between energy companies reacting to
merit order effects. Finally, while the effects of climate policies on energy markets have long been
under scrutiny, not enough is known about the direct effects of climate change on energy use and on
the availability of renewable energy sources.
5 Eco-innovation and climate-friendly technology diffusion
There is a growing academic interest in eco-innovation,10 defined, rather broadly, as “the creation or
implementation of new, or significantly improved, products, processes, marketing methods, organiza-
tional structures, and institutional arrangements which lead to environmental improvements compared
10Also known as green innovation, environmental innovation, environmentally-friendly innovation, or sustainable inno-
vation.
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to relevant alternatives” (Kemp, 2010). By fostering eco-innovation, society and policy makers can
tackle a number of pressing problems, such as the depletion of natural resources,11 security of energy
supply in countries depending on fossil fuel imports, and climate change due to greenhouse gas emis-
sions. However, innovation is not a sufficient condition for adaptation to and mitigation of climate
change: it is ineffective without diffusion and adoption. By technology diffusion one means, following
Rogers (1983), “the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over
time among the members of a social system”.
Climate-friendly technologies are characterized by several specificities, which need to be taken into
account in any robust approach to modelling diffusion of green innovation (Allan et al., 2014). First,
one needs to consider that no single technology can stop global warming, unless one believes in climate
engineering (Keith, 2013). Second, both climate change and technical change are highly cumulative pro-
cesses. The full benefits of technology diffusion for the climate are only attained with a delay of several
years, which also complicates policy assessments. Third, diffusion of climate-friendly technologies typi-
cally occurs in industries organized as large technical systems (e.g. the electricity industry, see Ku¨nneke
et al., 2010; Markard et al., 2012), and this renders the diffusion of new technologies a highly unstable,
inertial, and path dependent process.12 Recent evidence on the diffusion of environmentally-friendly
technologies can be found in Narbel (2013).
In standard, neoclassical economics, knowledge is nearly synonymous to codifiable information and
assumed to almost immediately spread within the economy as well as across economies. This probably
explains why, after acknowledging that diffusion has received little attention in the literature on green
technology, Pizer and Popp (2008) conclude that simplistic representations that ignore diffusion may be
sufficient, since most innovations exert their main impact within a decade. The issue of diffusion has not
been neglected in empirical works (also by Popp himself, see Popp et al., 2011) and neoclassical models
are able to reproduce the empirically observed S-shape of technological diffusion paths, but fundamental
issues such as the role of uncertainty, or the role of agents’ heterogeneity and the structures of interaction
networks are not adequately taken into account.13
11See the literature spawned by The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972), as summarized e.g. by Turner (2008)
and Dosi and Grazzi (2009).
12The history of new technology diffusion in the electricity industry is enlightening in this respect. The diffusion of
nuclear power, highly compatible with existing technologies, due to similar plant size and incorporating existing turbines,
was relatively fast, as it would have been the diffusion of combined-cycle gas turbines, if not hampered by oil crises in the
1970s. On the contrary, wind power is based on new technical principles and equipment, and has little compatibility with
the existing infrastructure, as the output of wind farms in hardly predictable. Hence, it finds a formidable barrier to its
diffusion.
13The workhorses of technology diffusion in the neoclassical camp are the “probit models” (Geroski, 2000), and the
“epidemic models” (Kiesling et al., 2012; Bass, 1969).
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In what follows, we briefly survey ABMs of diffusion in climate economics, by classifying them
according to the issues they have addressed.
5.1 Behavioral heterogeneity and income inequality
In ABMs, optimizing behavior is assumed away, or it is only one of the possible behavioral patterns.
In a number of works (e.g. Sopha et al. (2011), van Duinen et al. (2015), and Janssen and Jager (2001)
before them) agents alternatively engage in repetition, if their income satisfaction (the ratio between
actual income and potential income) is high and income uncertainty is low; in social comparison if
changes in the surrounding environment cause the satisfaction level to drop and uncertainty to grow; in
imitative behaviors if satisfied and uncertain; in deliberation (i.e. optimization) if their income levels
are below the satisfaction threshold, but uncertainty is perceived to be mild.
Adoption decisions by optimizing agents and heuristic followers are different, as the latter’s behavior
is more inertial, implying longer adoption lags. If they, moreover, engage in social comparison or
imitation, such inertia is magnified by their neighbor’s inertia. This makes a strong case for public policy
to encourage green technology adoption. The above are some implications of the ABM crafted by van
Duinen et al. (2015), exploring the adoption of new irrigation technologies by agricultural producers in
the face of increasing drought risk. In that model, the perceived satisfaction and uncertainty depend on
climate change effects, hence producer behaviors (repetition, social comparison, imitation, deliberation)
are endogenous. Climate uncertainty is found to be an additional influence slowing down adoption,
regardless of behavioral assumptions.
Adoption paths, though, are affected by the very heterogeneity in individual behaviors and prefer-
ences, as shown in the ABMs of Windrum et al. (2009), Janssen and Jager (2002), and Schwoon (2006).
Higher heterogeneity, indeed, can magnify the influence of some sub-sets of agents, accelerating regime
transitions or, alternatively, locking the system in the existing state. In particular, Windrum et al.
(2009) study how heterogeneous consumers preferences affect the incentives of firms to explore techno-
logical paradigms characterized by different levels of eco-friendliness. In their model, firms innovate by
searching in a fully modular NK technological landscape (see Frenken et al., 1999), and the landscape
fitness is inversely related to environmental pollution. Consumers have hedonic preferences and are
heterogeneous in the importance they give to environmental quality or to other attributes of the good.
They can also change their preferences, and in particular imitate those of consumers in classes having
better fitness. The paper shows that higher dispersion of preferences for environmental quality lowers
global pollution. This is because more dispersion implies a higher fraction of consumers who are heavily
concerned with climate issues. These “eco-warriors” provide firms with the incentives to explore the
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technological landscape towards goods with a better environmental content, further triggering imitation
of consumers from other preferences classes.
The nexus between green technology diffusion and behavioral heterogeneity can be better grasped
by considering the multi-dimensional features of green eco-friendly products. Sopha et al. (2011) focus
on the role of policies to foster the diffusion of new heating technologies, inspired by the case of subsidies
to heat pumps and wood-pellet heating in Norway, which were beneficial only to the diffusion of the
former. The model features households, who are placed on a social network and randomly follow
repetition, imitation, deliberation, or social comparison behaviors. The simulations show that policies
improving one attribute of the good at a time are not enough to foster diffusion. Complementarity
among attributes constrains the efficacy of the diffusion policies.
Agent heterogeneity can in fact hamper diffusion if it implies that the distance between pioneer
consumers and the remaining population is too high. Income inequality, in particular, can create a gap
that is difficult to bridge, unless appropriate policies are designed, perhaps even in the macroeconomic
domain. This is the take home message from Vona and Patriarca (2011), who assess the effects of
environmental taxation and income inequality on the diffusion of energy efficiency technologies. In
the model, a fall in the relative price of the green good stimulates adoption, which in turn feeds back
into further price decrease via learning. An environmental tax can foster the above dynamics, as it
affects the relative price of green goods. The effects of the tax are moderated by the average income
level, by income inequality, and by the rate of technological learning. The paper shows that, in a high
income country with sufficiently fast learning, income inequality slows down the diffusion of the green
technology, because of the mentioned gap between pioneers and the other potential adopters. Reforms
that aim to achieve a more equal income distribution can also improve the effectiveness of carbon taxes
in stimulating the diffusion of green technologies.
5.2 Learning and information spread
One of the key parameters in Vona and Patriarca (2011) was the learning rate. A debated issue
in climate policy concerns the adequacy of the phase-out period for subsidies as compared to the
learning rate that an unsubsidized industry would attain (e.g. the grid parity debate on renewable
energy). Subsidies to technologies that are able to “stand on their own legs” would be wasteful.
Cantono and Silverberg (2009) tackle this issue by modeling an economy populated by consumers who
are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for green goods and in their social network positions.
Consumers receive information on a new green technology from their neighbors. As the number of
adopters grows, the price of the new green good declines, fostering further adoption. The model is
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simulated under various scenarios, with and without a short-term subsidy, and tinkering with the
subsidy phase-out period. Simulations show that subsidies are effective if the phase-out parameter is
higher than a threshold. Moreover, both very slow and very fast learning may neutralize the subsidy
effects - either because it takes too much to attain the critical diffusion level, or because technology
would be adopted even without subsidies.
For consumer learning to be triggered, information on the new technologies is essential. Informa-
tion spread policies, though, seem to deliver their effects only under certain conditions. One of the
implications from Sopha et al. (2011) is that policies based on moral suasion (e.g. through education)
are ineffective. Eco-labeling is examined by Bleda and Valente (2009), who compare how two imple-
mentations of this policy (binary eco-labels, graded eco-labels) impact on green technology diffusion.
Consumers scan the market in search of the highest quality product. Yet, quality is a bi-dimensional
concept in the model: it concerns user quality as well as environmental quality. Consumers discard
products with quality below a given threshold and choose randomly among the remaining products.
Environmental quality can only be inferred through eco-labels. Firms invest cumulated profits in R&D
in response to technology diffusion patterns, under the assumption that user and environmental quality
are negatively correlated. Three scenarios are compared: without eco-labeling, with binary eco-labels,
and with graded eco-labels. Simulation results show that an upward trend in environmental quality is
only achieved with graded eco-labels.
5.3 Open issues
The reviewed ABMs fully take account of agent heterogeneity and direct non-price interactions, but
ABMs could fruitfully meet the systems approach challenge by Soete and Arundel (1993), according to
whom the speed of diffusion of a new technology depends not only on the market for the innovation
itself, but also on markets for related technologies, on the internal structure of the adopting firms
(including the flexibility of its organization), and on its current knowledge base and capability to learn.
To our knowledge, ABMs of green technology diffusion have not addressed this challenge yet. As
an instance of this, no attention has been paid so far to the firm-level strategies employed to reduce
emissions, and in particular to the choice between “end-of-pipe” clean-up technologies and “process
redesign” (see e.g. the discussion in Allan et al., 2014).14 Secondly, ABMs still do not capture some
14End-of-pipe technologies are the traditional target of environmental regulation and reduce emissions and/or mitigate
their adverse impacts by treating an eﬄuent stream and either neutralising the emissions or redirecting them to less
harmful disposals. In contrast, pollution prevention can be enacted by means of a re-design of production processes.
However, whereas end-of-pipe pollution control entails explicit and large capital outlays, related to the installation of new
equipment, the costs of process re-design are more subtle and hard to calculate, which then poses several hurdles to the
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other important specificities of climate-friendly technologies, such as the global nature of the climate
externalities. Concerning policy assessments, it is worth noting that it is unclear from the existing
ABMs whether diffusion benefits more from market-based policies or from command-and-control ones.
ABMs have so far mainly focused on how single policies affect the introduction and diffusion of climate-
friendly technologies. An extensive policy exploration approach would, instead, assess the effect of
policy portfolios and of varying the weights of the various policies in the portfolio.
6 Conclusions
The consequences of climate change for human welfare are likely to be enormous, and the intellectual
challenges presented by the economics of climate change are daunting. Complex systems science offers
flexible tools to analyse the relationship between the physical and the socio-economic system. By
accounting for heterogeneous agents and their interactions, agent based and network models allow one
to isolate mechanisms and effects that would otherwise be missing in the picture. This explains why
these models have recently been put forward as prominent alternatives to standard models rooted in
the general equilibrium paradigm (Farmer et al., 2015; Stern, 2016; Mercure et al., 2016).
In this paper, we reviewed the existing literature on complex system approaches to climate-related
issues. We identified four major areas of contribution and, for each of them, we discussed the open
challenges. The surveyed fields encompass climate negotiations and the formation of coalitions, macroe-
conomic and financial aspects linked to climate change, which comprehend (but are not limited to)
integrated assessment, energy sector dynamics, and the innovation in climate-friendly technologies and
their diffusion.
Various challenges remain to be undertaken and climate economics might benefit from a more
extensive use of agent-based and network approaches. In particular, the relationship between inequality
and climate damages and the effects of agents’ interconnectivity on climate policies and on the systemic
stability of production and financial networks are amongst the major issues that complexity theory
models of climate change are starting to investigate, and that would be extremely difficult to analyse
relying on any other framework.
At the same time, as the adoption of agent-based and network models to study the economics of
climate change is quite recent, there are still high margins of improvements and issues to be addressed.
In particular, the next generation of ABMs should try to bridge the different research areas discussed
in this survey. Fully-fledged integrated-assessment agent-based model should provide a more detailed
description of energy markets, “green” technological innovation and diffusion along the lines of the micro
diffusion of more eco-friendly production processes.
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and meso models presented in Sections 4 and 5. Similarly, climate coalition formation and negotiations
should be studied in macro ABMs. Finally, both micro and macro ABM should provide a better
account of the interrelations between financial markets, the real economy and climate change. How can
financial markets promote or hinder the discovery and diffusion of eco-friendly technologies? What is the
impact of stranded assets on energy production and more generally on macroeconomic dynamics? Can
new financial institutions (e.g. development banks, see Mazzucato, 2015) and unconventional policy
measures (e.g. “green” quantitative easing) foster the transition to a low-carbon economy? These are
some of the questions that network and agent-based models should answer in the next years.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge financial support from different European Projects. Francesco
Lamperti, Antoine Mandel, Mauro Napoletano, Andrea Roventini and Alessandro Sapio acknowledge
financial support from European Union 7th FP grant agreement No. 603416 - IMPRESSIONS. Tomas
Balint and Antoine Mandel acknowledge financial support from European Union 7th FP grant agree-
ment No. 610704 - SIMPOL. Antoine Mandel, Mauro Napoletano and Andrea Roventini acknowledge
financial support from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under
grant agreement No. 640772 - DOLFINS and No. 649186 - ISIGrowth. All the usual disclaimers apply.
23
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.58
 
 
References
Acemoglu, D., P. Aghion, L. Bursztyn, and D. Hemous (2012). The environment and directed technical
change. American Economic Review 102 (1), 131–66.
Allan, C., A. B. Jaffe, and I. Sin (2014). Diffusion of green technology: a survey. International Review
of Environmental and Resource Economics 7 (1), 1–33.
Anaya, K. L. and M. G. Pollitt (2015). Integrating distributed generation: Regulation and trends in
three leading countries. Energy Policy 85, 475–486.
Balbi, S. and C. Giupponi (2010). Agent-based modelling of socio-ecosystems: A methodology for
the analysis of adaptation to climate change. International Journal of Agent Technologies and Sys-
tems 2 (4), 17–38.
Banal-Estanol, A. and A. Ruperez Micola (2011). Behavioural simulations in spot electricity markets.
European Journal of Operational Research 214 (1), 147–159.
Bardoscia, M., S. Battiston, F. Caccioli, and G. Caldarelli (2015). Debtrank: A microscopic foundation
for shock propagation. PloS one 10 (6), e0130406.
Barrett, S. (1994). Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford Economic Papers 46,
878–894.
Bass, F. M. (1969). A simultaneous equation regression study of advertising and sales of cigarettes.
Journal of Marketing Research 6 (3), 291–300.
Battiston, S., D. D. Gatti, M. Gallegati, B. Greenwald, and J. E. Stiglitz (2012). Liaisons dangereuses:
Increasing connectivity, risk sharing, and systemic risk. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Con-
trol 36 (8), 1121 – 1141. Quantifying and Understanding Dysfunctions in Financial Markets.
Battiston, S., A. Mandel, I. Monasterolo, F. Schuetze, and G. Visentin (2016). A climate stress-test of
the eu financial system. mimeo, available at SSRN.
Battiston, S., M. Puliga, R. Kaushik, P. Tasca, and G. Caldarelli (2012, 08). Debtrank: Too central to
fail? financial networks, the fed and systemic risk. Scientific Reports 2, 541 EP –.
Beale, N., D. G. Rand, H. Battey, K. Croxson, R. M. May, and M. A. Nowak (2011). Individual versus
systemic risk and the regulator’s dilemma. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108 (31),
12647–12652.
24
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.58
 
 
Beckenbach, F. and R. Briegel (2010). Multi-agent modeling of economic innovation dynamics and its
implications for analyzing emission impacts. International Economics and Economic Policy 7 (2),
317–341.
Benchekroun, H. and D. Claude (2007). Tax differentials and the segmentation of networks of cooper-
ation in oligopoly. The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 7 (1), 1–11.
Bierkandt, R., L. Wenz, S. N. Willner, and A. Levermann (2014). Acclimate—a model for economic
damage propagation. part 1: basic formulation of damage transfer within a global supply network
and damage conserving dynamics. Environment Systems and Decisions 34 (4), 507–524.
Bleda, M. and M. Valente (2009). Graded eco-labels: a demand-oriented approach to reduce pollution.
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 76 (4), 512–524.
Boden, T., G. Marland, and R. Andres (2015). National co2 emissions from fossil-fuel burning, cement
manufacture, and gas flaring: 1751-2011. Technical report, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis
Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy.
Boffa, F. and A. Sapio (2015). Introduction to the special issue ”The regional integration of energy
markets”. Energy Policy 85, 421–425.
Borenstein, S., J. Bushnell, and S. Stoft (2000, Summer). The Competitive Effects of Transmission
Capacity in A Deregulated Electricity Industry. RAND Journal of Economics 31 (2), 294–325.
Bosetti, V., C. Carraro, M. Galeotti, E. Massetti, and M. Tavoni (2006). Witch a world induced
technical change hybrid model. The Energy Journal 27, 13–37.
Bosetti, V. and M. Maffezzoli (2013, September). Taxing Carbon under Market Incompleteness. Work-
ing Papers 2013.72, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
Bower, J. and D. Bunn (2001). Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discrim-
inatory auctions in the england and wales electricity market. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control 25 (3-4), 561 – 592. Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE).
Breton, M., L. Sbragia, and G. Zaccour (2010). A dynamic model for international environmental
agreements. Environmental and Resource Economics 45 (1), 25–48.
Brouwers, L., K. Hansson, H. Verhagen, and M. Boman (2001). Agent models of catastrophic events.
In Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, 10th European workshop on Multi Agent
Systems.
25
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.58
 
 
Browne, O., S. Poletti, and D. Young (2015). How does market power affect the impact of large scale
wind investment in ’energy only’ wholesale electricity markets? Energy Policy 87, 17–27.
Bruckner, T., R. Morrison, and T. Wittmann (2005). Public policy modeling of distributed energy
technologies: strategies, attributes, and challenges. Ecological Economics 54 (2–3), 328 – 345. Tech-
nological Change and the EnvironmentTechnological Change.
Buldyrev, S. V., R. Parshani, G. Paul, H. E. Stanley, and S. Havlin (2010, 04). Catastrophic cascade
of failures in interdependent networks. Nature 464 (7291), 1025–1028.
Bunn, D. W. and M. Martoccia (2005). Unilateral and collusive market power in the electricity pool
of england and wales. Energy Economics 27 (2), 305–315.
Bunn, D. W. and J. I. Munoz (2016). Supporting the externality of intermittency in policies for
renewable energy. Energy Policy 88, 594–602.
Bunn, D. W. and F. S. Oliveira (2003). Evaluating individual market power in electricity markets via
agent-based simulation. Annals of Operations Research 121 (1), 57–77.
Cambini, C. and A. Rubino (2014). Regional energy initiatives in the mediterranean basin. In C. Cam-
bini and A. Rubino (Eds.), Regional Energy Initiatives: MedReg and the Energy Community, pp.
1–10. London: Routledge.
Campiglio, E. (2016). Beyond carbon pricing: The role of banking and monetary policy in financing
the transition to a low-carbon economy. Ecological Economics 121, 220 – 230.
Cantono, S. and G. Silverberg (2009). A percolation model of eco-innovation diffusion: The rela-
tionship between diffusion, learning economies and subsidies. Technological Forecasting & Social
Change 76 (4), 487–496.
Castesana, P., S. Puliafito, et al. (2013). Development of an agent-based model and its application to
the estimation of global carbon emissions. Low Carbon Economy 4 (4), 24–34.
Cochrane, H. (2004). Economic loss: myth and measurement. Disaster Prevention and Management:
An International Journal 13 (4), 290–296.
Courtois, P. and T. Tazda¨ıt (2007). Games of influence in climate change negotiations: Modelling
interactions. ecological modelling 204 (3), 301–314.
de Miera, G. S., P. d. R. Gonzalez, and I. Vizcaino (2008). Analysing the impact of renewable electricity
support schemes on power prices: The case of wind electricity in spain. Energy Policy 36 (9), 3345–
3359.
26
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.58
 
 
Dell, M., B. F. Jones, and B. A. Olken (2012). Temperature shocks and economic growth: Evidence
from the last half century. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 4 (3), 66–95.
Dennig, F., M. B. Budolfson, M. Fleurbaey, A. Siebert, and R. H. Socolow (2015). Inequality, cli-
mate impacts on the future poor, and carbon prices. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci-
ences 112 (52), 15827–15832.
Denton, M. J., S. J. Rassenti, and V. L. Smith (2001). Spot market mechanism design and competitivity
issues in electric power. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 44 (4), 435–453.
Dosi, G., G. Fagiolo, M. Napoletano, and A. Roventini (2013). Income distribution, credit and fiscal
policies in an agent-based keynesian model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 37 (8), 1598
– 1625. Rethinking Economic Policies in a Landscape of Heterogeneous Agents.
Dosi, G., G. Fagiolo, and A. Roventini (2010). Schumpeter meeting Keynes: A policy-friendly model of
endogenous growth and business cycles. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34 (9), 1748–
1767.
Dosi, G. and M. Grazzi (2009). Energy, development and the environment: an appraisal three decades
after the limits to growth debate. In A. Pyka, U. Cantner, A. Greiner, and T. Kuhn (Eds.), Recent
Advances in Neo-Schumpeterian Economics. Edward Elgar.
Dosi, G. and R. R. Nelson (2010). Chapter 3 - technical change and industrial dynamics as evolutionary
processes. In B. H. Hall and N. Rosenberg (Eds.), Handbook of The Economics of Innovation, Vol.
1, Volume 1 of Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, pp. 51 – 127. North-Holland.
Downing, T. E., S. Moss, and C. Pahl-Wostl (2001). Understanding climate policy using participatory
agent-based social simulation. In Multi-Agent-Based Simulation, pp. 198–213. Springer.
Earnest, D. C. (2008). Coordination in large numbers: An agent-based model of international negoti-
ations. International Studies Quarterly 52 (2), 363–382.
Elliston, B., M. Diesendorf, and I. MacGill (2012). Simulations of scenarios with 100australian national
electricity market. Energy Policy 45, 606 – 613.
Faber, A., M. Valente, and P. Janssen (2010). Exploring domestic micro-cogeneration in the netherlands:
An agent-based demand model for technology diffusion. Energy Policy 38 (6), 2763 – 2775. The Role
of Trust in Managing Uncertainties in the Transition to a Sustainable Energy Economy, Special
Section with Regular Papers.
27
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.58
 
 
Farmer, D. J. and D. Foley (2009). The economy needs agent-based modeling. Nature 460, 685–686.
Farmer, J. D., C. Hepburn, P. Mealy, and A. Teytelboym (2015). A third wave in the economics of
climate change. Environmental and Resource Economics 62 (2), 329–357.
Fawcett, T. (2010). Personal carbon trading: A policy ahead of its time? Energy Policy 38 (11), 6868
– 6876. Energy Efficiency Policies and Strategies with regular papers.
Filatova, T., P. H. Verburg, D. C. Parker, and C. A. Stannard (2013). Spatial agent-based models for
socio-ecological systems: Challenges and prospects. Environmental Modelling & Software 45, 1–7.
Thematic Issue on Spatial Agent-Based Models for Socio-Ecological Systems.
Flake, G. W. (1988). The Computational Beauty of Nature. The MIT Press.
Frenken, K., L. Marengo, and M. Valente (1999). Interdependencies, nearly-decomposability and adap-
tation. In Computational techniques for modelling learning in economics, pp. 145–165. Springer.
Geroski, P. A. (2000). Models of technology diffusion. Research Policy 29 (4), 603–625.
Gerst, M., P. Wang, A. Roventini, G. Fagiolo, G. Dosi, R. Howarth, and M. Borsuk (2013). Agent-
based modeling of climate policy: An introduction to the {ENGAGE} multi-level model framework.
Environmental Modelling & Software 44, 62 – 75. Thematic Issue on Innovative Approaches to Global
Change Modelling.
Greeven, S. (2015). Society’s response to climate change-A scenario discovery study using agent-based
modelling. Ph. D. thesis, TU Delft, Delft University of Technology.
Guerci, E., S. Ivaldi, and S. Cincotti (2005). Modeling and implementation of an artificial electricity
market using agent-based technology. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 355 (1),
69–76.
Guerci, E., S. Ivaldi, and S. Cincotti (2008). Learning agents in an artificial power exchange: Tacit collu-
sion, market power and efficiency of two double-auction mechanisms. Computational Economics 32 (1-
2), 73–98.
Guerci, E., M. A. Rastergar, and S. Cincotti (2010). Agent-based modeling and simulation of compet-
itive wholesale electricity markets. In Handbook of Power Systems II, pp. 241–286. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg.
Guerci, E. and A. Sapio (2012). High wind Penetration in an Agent-Based Model of the Electricity
Market. The Case of Italy. Revue de l’OFCE 0 (5), 415–447.
28
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.58
 
 
Guerci, E. and S. Sapio (2011). Comparison and empirical validation of optimizing and agent-based
models of the italian electricity market. In 2011 8th International Conference on the European Energy
Market (EEM), pp. 849–856.
Haas, A. and C. Jaeger (2005). Agents, bayes, and climatic risks-a modular modelling approach.
Advances in Geosciences 4 (4), 3–7.
Haimes, Y. and P. Jiang (2001). Leontief-based model of risk in complex interconnected infrastructures.
Journal of Infrastructure Systems 7 (1), 1–12.
Hallegatte, S. (2008). An adaptive regional input-output model and its application to the assessment
of the economic cost of katrina. Risk Analysis 28 (3), 779–799.
Hallegatte, S. (2014). Modeling the role of inventories and heterogeneity in the assessment of the
economic costs of natural disasters. Risk Analysis 34 (1), 152–167.
Hallegatte, S., N. Ranger, O. Mestre, P. Dumas, J. Corfee-Morlot, C. Herweijer, and R. M. Wood
(2010). Assessing climate change impacts, sea level rise and storm surge risk in port cities: a case
study on copenhagen. Climatic Change 104 (1), 113–137.
Heitzig, J., K. Lessmann, and Y. Zou (2011). Self-enforcing strategies to deter free-riding in the climate
change mitigation game and other repeated public good games. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences 108 (38), 15739–15744.
Helbing, D. (2013, 05). Globally networked risks and how to respond. Nature 497 (7447), 51–59.
Henriet, F., S. Hallegatte, and L. Tabourier (2012). Firm-network characteristics and economic robust-
ness to natural disasters. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 36 (1), 150 – 167.
Hoel, M. and K. Schneider (1997). Incentives to participate in an international environmental agree-
ment. Environmental and Resource economics 9 (2), 153–170.
Homer-Dixon, T., B. Walker, R. Biggs, A.-S. Cre´pin, C. Folke, E. F. Lambin, G. D. Peterson, J. Rock-
stro¨m, M. Scheffer, W. Steffen, et al. (2015). Synchronous failure: the emerging causal architecture
of global crisis. Ecology and Society 20 (3), 6.
IPCC (2014). Climate change working group iii contribution to the ipcc fifth assessment report. In
O. Edenhofer, R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum,
S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, et al. (Eds.), Climate change 2014: Mitigation of climate change. Cam-
bridge (UK) and New York (US): Cambridge University Press.
29
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.58
 
 
Isley, S., R. Lempert, S. Popper, and R. Vardavas (2013). An evolutionary model of industry transforma-
tion and the political sustainability of emission control policies. Technical report, RAND Corporation
- TR-1308-NSF.
Isley, S. C., R. J. Lempert, S. W. Popper, and R. Vardavas (2015). The effect of near-term policy
choices on long-term greenhouse gas transformation pathways. Global Environmental Change 34,
147–158.
Jackson, J. (2010). Improving energy efficiency and smart grid program analysis with agent-based
end-use forecasting models. Energy Policy 38 (7), 3771 – 3780. Large-scale wind power in electricity
markets with Regular Papers.
Jaeger, C. (2012). Scarcity and coordination in the global commons. In C. Jaeger, K. Hasselmann,
G. Leipold, D. Mangalagiu, and J. D. Ta`bara (Eds.), Reframing the Problem of Climate Change:
From Zero Sum Game to Win-Win Solutions, pp. 85–101. Routledge.
Jaeger, C., K. Hasselmann, G. Leipold, D. Mangalagiu, and J. D. Ta`bara (2013). Reframing the problem
of climate change: from zero sum game to win-win solutions. Routledge.
Jaeger, C. C. and J. Jaeger (2011). Three views of two degrees. Regional Environmental Change 11 (1),
15–26.
Jamasb, T. and M. Pollitt (2005). Electricity market reform in the european union: review of progress
toward liberalization & integration. The Energy Journal 26, 11–41.
Janssen, M. and B. de Vries (1998). The battle of perspectives: a multi-agent model with adaptive
responses to climate change. Ecological economics 26 (1), 43–65.
Janssen, M. and W. Jager (2001). Fashions, habits and changing preferences: Simulation of psycholog-
ical factors affecting market dynamics. Journal of Economic Psychology 22 (6), 745–772.
Janssen, M. and W. Jager (2002). Simulating diffusion of green products. Journal of Evolutionary
Economics 12 (3), 283–306.
Janssen, M. A. and E. Ostrom (2006). Governing social-ecological systems. Handbook of computational
economics 2, 1465–1509.
Karpf, A., S. Battiston, and A. Mandel (2016). A network-based analysis of the EU ETS. In S. Battiston,
F. D. Pellegrini, G. Caldarelli, and E. Merelli (Eds.), Proceedings of ECCS 2014, Springer Proceedings
in Complexity. Springer.
30
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.58
 
 
Keith, D. (2013). A case for climate engineering. MIT Press.
Kelly, R. A., A. J. Jakeman, O. Barreteau, M. E. Borsuk, S. ElSawah, S. H. Hamilton, H. J. Hen-
riksen, S. Kuikka, H. R. Maier, A. E. Rizzoli, H. van Delden, and A. A. Voinov (2013). Selecting
among five common modelling approaches for integrated environmental assessment and management.
Environmental Modelling & Software 47, 159 – 181.
Kemp, R. (2010). Eco-innovation: definition, measurement, and open research issues. Economia
Politica 27 (3), 397–420.
Kiesling, E., M. Gu¨nther, C. Stummer, and L. Wakolbinger (2012). Agent-based simulation of innova-
tion diffusion: a review. Central European Journal of Operations Research 20 (2), 183–230.
Knight, F. (1921). Risk, Uncertainty, and Profits. Chicago, Chicago University Press.
Kowalska-Pyzalska, A., K. Maciejowska, K. Suszczyn´ski, K. Sznajd-Weron, and R. Weron (2014).
Turning green: Agent-based modeling of the adoption of dynamic electricity tariffs. Energy Policy 72,
164 – 174.
Kunneke, R. (2008). Institutional reform and technological practice: the case of electricity. Industrial
and Corporate Change 17 (2), 233–265.
Ku¨nneke, R., J. Groenewegen, and C. Menard (2010). Aligning modes of organization with technology:
Critical transactions in the reform of infrastructures. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organiza-
tion 75 (3), 494–505.
L’Abbate, A., G. Migliavacca, R. Calisti, C. Brancucci Martinez-Anido, A. Chaouachi, and G. Fulli
(2014). Regional energy initiatives in the mediterranean basin. In C. Cambini and A. Rubino (Eds.),
Regional Energy Initiatives: MedReg and the Energy Community. London: Routledge.
Lamperti, F., G. Dosi, M. Napoletano, A. Roventini, and A. Sapio (2016). Faraway, so close: an
agent-based model for climate, energy and macroeconomic policy. LEM working papers forthcoming,
Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa,
Italy.
Lee, T., R. Yao, and P. Coker (2014). An analysis of {UK} policies for domestic energy reduction using
an agent based tool. Energy Policy 66, 267 – 279.
Lempert, R., J. Scheffran, and D. F. Sprinz (2009). Methods for long-term environmental policy
challenges. Global Environmental Politics 9 (3), 106–133.
31
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.58
 
 
Lessmann, K., U. Kornek, V. Bosetti, R. Dellink, J. Emmerling, J. Eyckmans, M. Nagashima, H.-P.
Weikard, and Z. Yang (2015). The stability and effectiveness of climate coalitions. Environmental
and Resource Economics 62 (4), 811–836.
Li, H. and L. Tesfatsion (2009, Summer). Development of open source software for power market
research: the AMES test bed. The Journal of Energy Markets 2 (2), 111–128.
Mandel, A., S. Fu¨rst, W. Lass, F. Meissner, and C. Jaeger (2009). Lagom generic: an agent-based
model of growing economies. Technical report, European Climate Forum, Working Paper 1/2009.
Markard, J., R. Raven, and B. Truffer (2012). Sustainability transitions: An emerging field of research
and its prospects. Research Policy 41 (6), 955–967.
Matthews, R. B., N. G. Gilbert, A. Roach, J. G. Polhill, and N. M. Gotts (2007). Agent-based land-use
models: a review of applications. Landscape Ecology 22 (10), 1447–1459.
Mazzucato, M. (2015). The (green?) entrepreneurial state. In The Politics of Green Transformations.
Routledge.
McGinty, M. (2006). International environmental agreements among asymmetric nations. Oxford
Economic Papers 59 (1), 45–62.
Meadows, D. H., D. L. Meadows, J. Randers, and W. W. Behrens (1972). The limits to growth. New
York: Universe Books.
Mercure, J.-F., H. Pollitt, A. M. Bassi, J. E. Vin˜uales, and N. R. Edwards (2016). Modelling complex
systems of heterogeneous agents to better design sustainability transitions policy. Global Environ-
mental Change 37, 102 – 115.
Monasterolo, I. and M. Raberto (2016). A hybrid system dynamics – agent based model to assess the
role of green fiscal and monetary policies. Technical report, SSRN.
Moss, S. (2002a). Agent based modelling for integrated assessment. Integrated Assessment 3 (1), 63–77.
Moss, S. (2002b). Policy analysis from first principles. PNAS 99 (3), 72677274.
Moss, S., C. Pahl-Wostl, and T. Downing (2001). Agent-based integrated assessment modelling: the
example of climate change. Integrated Assessment 2 (1), 17–30.
Mureddu, M., G. Caldarelli, A. Chessa, A. Scala, and A. Damiano (2015). Green power grids: How
energy from renewable sources affects networks and markets. PloS one 10 (9), e0135312.
32
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.58
 
 
Narbel, P. A. (2013). What is really behind the adoption of new renewable electricity generating
technologies? Energy for Sustainable Development 17 (4), 386–390.
Nicolaisen, J., V. Petrov, and L. Tesfatsion (2001). Market power and efficiency in a computational
electricity market with discriminatory double-auction pricing. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary
Computation 5 (5), 504–523.
Nordhaus, W. et al. (2015). Climate clubs: Overcoming free-riding in international climate policy.
American Economic Review 105 (4), 1339–70.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1992). An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. Sci-
ence 258 (5086), 1315–1319.
Nordhaus, W. D. (2008). A question of balance: economic modeling of global warming. Yale University
Press New Haven.
Okuyama, Y. (2004). Modeling spatial economic impacts of an earthquake: input-output approaches.
Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal 13 (4), 297–306.
Okuyama, Y. and J. R. Santos (2014). Disaster impact and input-output analysis. Economic Systems
Research 26 (1), 1–12.
Perdan, S. and A. Azapagic (2011). Carbon trading: Current schemes and future developments. Energy
Policy 39 (10), 6040 – 6054. Sustainability of biofuels.
Pindyck, R. S. (2013, September). Climate Change Policy: What Do the Models Tell Us? Journal of
Economic Literature 51 (3), 860–72.
Pizer, W. A. and D. Popp (2008). Endogenizing technological change: Matching empirical evidence to
modeling needs. Energy Economics 30 (6), 2754–2770.
Popp, D., I. Hascic, and N. Medhi (2011). Technology and the diffusion of renewable energy. Energy
Economics 33 (4), 648–662.
Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International
organization 42 (03), 427–460.
Rassenti, S. J., V. L. Smith, and B. J. Wilson (2003). Discriminatory price auctions in electricity
markets: low volatility at the expense of high price levels. Journal of Regulatory Economics 23 (2),
109–123.
33
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.58
 
 
Rengs, B., M. Wackerle, A. Gazheli, M. Antal, and J. van den Bergh (2015). Testing innovation,
employment and distributional impacts of climate policy packages in a macro-evolutionary systems
setting. Working paper 83, WWWforEurope.
Revesz, R. L., P. H. Howard, K. Arrow, L. H. Goulder, R. E. Kopp, M. A. Livermore, M. Oppen-
heimer, and T. Sterner (2014). Global warming: Improve economic models of climate change. Na-
ture 508 (7495), 173–175.
Robalino, D. A. and R. J. Lempert (2000). Carrots and sticks for new technology: Abating greenhouse
gas emissions in a heterogeneous and uncertain world. Integrated Assessment 1 (1), 1–19.
Rogers, E. (1983). Diffusion of innovations (Third edition ed.). New York: Free Press.
Rothkopf, M. H. (1999). Daily repetition: A neglected factor in the analysis of electricity auctions. The
Electricity Journal 12 (3), 60 – 70.
Rozenberg, J., C. Guivarch, R. Lempert, and S. Hallegatte (2014). Building ssps for climate policy anal-
ysis: a scenario elicitation methodology to map the space of possible future challenges to mitigation
and adaptation. Climatic change 122 (3), 509–522.
Saguan, M., N. Keseric, P. Dessante, and J. m. Glachant (2006, Aug). Market power in power markets:
Game theory vs. agent-based approach. In 2006 IEEE/PES Transmission Distribution Conference
and Exposition: Latin America, pp. 1–6.
Sapio, A. (2014). The diffusion of renewable energy technologies in the mediterranean basin. In
C. Cambini and A. Rubino (Eds.), Regional Energy Initiatives: MedReg and the Energy Community,
pp. 261–280. Routledge.
Schwoon, M. (2006). Simulating the adoption of fuel cell vehicles. Journal of Evolutionary Eco-
nomics 16 (4), 435–472.
Smajgl, A., D. G. Brown, D. Valbuena, and M. G. Huigen (2011). Empirical characterisation of agent
behaviours in socio-ecological systems. Environmental Modelling & Software 26 (7), 837 – 844.
Smead, R., R. L. Sandler, P. Forber, and J. Basl (2014). A bargaining game analysis of international
climate negotiations. Nature Climate Change 4 (6), 442–445.
Soete, L. and A. Arundel (1993). An integrated approach to european innovation and technology
diffusion policy (a Maastricht memorandum). EUR(Luxembourg).
34
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.58
 
 
Sopha, B. M., C. A. Klo¨ckner, and E. G. Hertwich (2011). Exploring policy options for a transition to
sustainable heating system diffusion using an agent-based simulation. Energy Policy 39 (5), 2722–
2729.
Sorrell, S. and J. Sijm (2003). Carbon trading in the policy mix. Oxford Review of Economic Pol-
icy 19 (3), 420–437.
Sterman, J. D., T. Fiddaman, T. Franck, A. Jones, S. McCauley, P. Rice, E. Sawin, and L. Siegel
(2013). Management flight simulators to support climate negotiations. Environmental Modelling &
Software 44, 122 – 135. Thematic Issue on Innovative Approaches to Global Change Modelling.
Stern, N. (2013). The structure of economic modeling of the potential impacts of climate change:
Grafting gross underestimation of risk onto already narrow science models. Journal of Economic
Literature 51, 838–859.
Stern, N. (2016). Current climate models are grossly misleading. Nature 530 (7591), 407–409.
Sun, J. and L. Tesfatsion (2007). Dynamic testing of wholesale power market designs: An open-source
agent-based framework. Computational Economics 30 (3), 291–327.
Tesfatsion, L. (2003). Agent-based computational economics: modeling economies as complex adaptive
systems. Information Sciences 149 (4), 262–268.
Tesfatsion, L., Y. Jieb, C. R. Rehmannc, and W. J. Gutowski (2015). Waccshed: A platform for the
study of watersheds as dynamic coupled natural and human systems waccshed: A platform for the
study of watersheds as dynamic coupled natural and human systems. Working paper 15022, ISU
Economics.
Tesfatsion, L. and K. L. Judd (2006). Handbook of computational economics: agent-based computational
economics, Volume 2. Elsevier.
Tol, R. S. (1997). On the optimal control of carbon dioxide emissions: an application of fund. Envi-
ronmental Modeling & Assessment 2 (3), 151–163.
Turner, G. M. (2008). A comparison of the limits to growth with 30 years of reality. Global Environ-
mental Change 18 (3), 397–411.
van Duinen, R., T. Filatova, W. Jager, and A. van der Veen (2015). Going beyond perfect rationality:
drought risk, economic choices and the influence of social networks. The Annals of Regional Science,
1–35.
35
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.58
 
 
Ventosa, M., A. Baillo, A. Ramos, and M. Rivier (2005). Electricity market modeling trends. Energy
Policy 33 (7), 897 – 913.
Vona, F. and F. Patriarca (2011). Income inequality and the development of environmental technologies.
Ecological Economics 70 (11), 2201–2213.
Voudouris, V., D. Stasinopoulos, R. Rigby, and C. D. Maio (2011). The {ACEGES} laboratory for
energy policy: Exploring the production of crude oil. Energy Policy 39 (9), 5480 – 5489.
Wang, J., V. Koritarov, and J.-H. Kim (2012). Cap and trade modeling in electricity markets using an
agent-based approach. In P. Q. Zheng, S. Rebennack, M. P. Pardalos, F. M. V. Pereira, and A. N.
Iliadis (Eds.), Handbook of CO2 in Power Systems, pp. 71–87. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin
Heidelberg.
Weidlich, A. and D. Veit (2008). A critical survey of agent-based wholesale electricity market models.
Energy Economics 30 (4), 1728 – 1759.
Weitzman, M. L. (2013). Tail-hedge discounting and the social cost of carbon. Journal of Economic
Literature 51, 873–882.
Wenz, L., S. N. Willner, R. Bierkandt, and A. Levermann (2014). Acclimate—a model for economic
damage propagation. part ii: a dynamic formulation of the backward effects of disaster-induced
production failures in the global supply network. Environment Systems and Decisions 34 (4), 525–
539.
Windrum, P., T. Ciarli, and C. Birchenhall (2009). Consumer heterogeneity and the development of
environmentallyfriendly technologies. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 76 (4), 533–551.
Wolf, S., S. Fu¨rst, A. Mandel, W. Lass, D. Lincke, F. Pablo-Mart´ı, and C. Jaeger (2013). A multi-agent
model of several economic regions. Environmental modelling & software 44, 25–43.
Zhang, B., Y. Zhang, and J. Bi (2011). An adaptive agent-based modeling approach for analyzing
the influence of transaction costs on emissions trading markets. Environmental Modelling & Soft-
ware 26 (4), 482 – 491.
Zhang, H., L. Cao, and B. Zhang (2016). Emissions trading and technology adoption: An adaptive
agent-based analysis of thermal power plants in China. Resources, Conservation and Recycling forth-
coming, –.
36
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.58
 
 
